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ABSTRACT
This paper creates a conceptual framework for understanding
limited partnership interests in real estate as securities and
how such interests relate to the underlying assets. The
measure of testing this framework focuses on the cash returns
to the investor. The question is whether higher returns can be
achieved by forming limited partnerships for the purpose of
securitizing more risky asset plays, e.g., the development
equity syndication. Information for testing the framework
comes from a selected groups of existing publicly-registered
limited partnerships.
The results indicate that the estimated yields from three
partnerships formed for land development, a riskier asset play,
are very close to the yields of three partnerships investing in
existing properties. This runs contrary to the expected
result of higher yields for higher risk. Despite these
findings, the proven performance of one asset manager's
portfolio of development properties shows that higher yields
can be achieved through higher risk real estate assets. The
thesis suggests that syndicators will become more active in
forming limited partnerships to invest in these kinds of real
estate assets in an attempt to provide higher cash yields to
investors.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Associate Professor
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose
Development equity syndications will become a more
significant type of syndication offering to the investing
public in the near future. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA
86) eliminated many of the tax benefits of investing in real
estate which resulted in an immediate decline in the sales of
real estate limited partnerships (RELPs). Going forward, the
most important component of return to investors will be the
true economic returns, that is cash distributions, from such
partnerships. With renewed interest in cash distributions by
investors, RELPs that provide higher returns than other kinds
of security interests should sell in the market. The
development equity syndication, while riskier than an equity
syndication of existing property, offers the potential to
achieve these higher returns. To understand this new stage of
the syndication market, an examination and understanding of
this market will be detailed. Subsequently, information will
7
be presented which will support this argument.
Syndication provides a means for the flow of capital from
suppliers of capital -- investors -- to those in demand of
capital -- developers, property sellers, and others who utilize
capital for productive purposes. Interests in RELPs represent
the securitization of an asset or group of assets easily
acquired by investors seeking such investment. These
securities should offer a return comparable to the degree of
risk associated with the underlying asset and the risk inherent
in the security. In many ways, RELPs differ from other types
of securities due to both the nature of the security and the
asset represented by such securities. RELPs do not offer
liquidity, and the extent to which the asset can increase or
decrease in value often becomes subject to localized market
forces which cannot be influenced by any such management
action. Understanding the differences between a partnership
interest and other securities is relevant to understanding how
such securities perform in terms of return to the investor.
However, the more interesting question addressed by this thesis
focuses on the differences within real estate assets themselves
and how investor returns might be expected to differ given the
underlying nature of the asset. First, the framework for
thinking about how returns from real estate at different stages
of the development cycle might vary will be examined. Second,
8
an exploration of the actual performance from RELPs organized
for two stages of the development process -- land development
and acquisition of operating properties -- is compared against
the framework of expected returns. Keeping this framework in
mind, the thesis presents an explanation of the development
equity syndication and the results for one large investor in
this kind of real estate security.
Because real estate syndication activities raised more
than $29 billion dollars over the past five years, it cannot be
ignored as a provider of capital to the -real estate industry.
While part of the attractiveness in prior years resulted from
the benefits of tax shelter, not all deals depended on such tax
shelter for their existence. If the industry is to remain an
active provider of capital, the investor will need to be
compensated accordingly to make such RELPs attractive. This
attraction, I maintain, may come from the promotion of RELPs
securitizing more risky asset plays.
B. Data Sources
Making a prediction and proving it based on factual data
can be a daunting task, especially given the broad nature of
the marketplace and the difficulty categorizing all of the
components into neat boxes. Instead, the research done for
9
this thesis begins with a look at the broader aspects of the
industry and makes a series of assumptions thereby narrowing
the level of scrutiny to a more manageable level.
To research the market for syndication investments, data
came from a number of sources, primarily information on
offerings published by the Robert A. Stanger Company, a firm
specializing in tracking this industry. Qualitative
information came from a number of other groups close to the
industry, especially the Real Estate Securities and Syndication
Institute (RESSI) and from the National Investment Partnership
as well as from other researchers studying this field.
Specific information on actual performance data presented
the most difficult aspect of data collection. The private
placement sector of the industry, the largest fund raiser until
1987, cannot be tracked in detail as federal securities laws do
not require extensive disclosure through the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and no central clearinghouse of
information exists for this group. RELPs offered to the
broader public must pass through the SEC and this results in a
greater level of data on this sector. Performance data for
existing public RELPs is drawn from published information
included in current offerings by RELP sponsors. Sponsors are
required by SEC guidelines to include prior performance data
10
in current public offerings.
C. Thesis Structure
This first chapter sets the stage for understanding the
orientation of this paper towards the syndication segment of
the real estate securities market. It finishes with a brief
history of the syndication industry since the end of World War
II. The second chapter begins with a discussion of the
creation of product in the real estate industry. It lays out
the degrees of risk and return across the spectrum of product
in this industry. Next, this chapter looks at the real estate
security and compares RELPs to other real estate securities. A
specific understanding of the limited partnership as an
investment vehicle is then presented.
Developing a strategy for thinking about the
securitization of the real estate limited partnership offerings
is the theme of the third chapter. First, a brief review of
thinking about the returns from real estate and RELPs in
particular is presented. The second part of this chapter
creates a framework for thinking about the returns from RELPs
whose underlying assets cover the range of product created
throughout the development cycle.
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Chapter Four examines the market for real estate limited
partnerships with a look at the marketing orientation and
product types available to investors over the course of the
past 10 years or so. A look at issues that are not asset
specific forms the first section of this chapter. Tax-shelter
partnerships are not reviewed due to their relative brief
history (1981-1985) and the near-elimination of these deals as
a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This chapter also
examines sponsors of real estate limited partnerships.
In the fifth chapter, the returns of deals structured by
two syndicators are examined. The objective is to evaluate
whether the expectations about the risk/return investment
relationship made in the preceding chapters conform to actual
performance data.
Looking at development syndication becomes the centerpiece
of the sixth chapter. First, the chapter reviews of the
experience of one sponsor in development joint ventures.
Second, the chapter explores some questions regarding this
form of RELP. What considerations become important in
organizing and managing these RELPs? To what extent are they
an element in the syndication marketplace and how will this
change in the future? How are these syndication deals
different from other RELPs and how do the returns differ? Will
12
more investors seek out these deals? What role will the
sponsor play? Last, some predictions are made regarding
investor interest in this form of RELP.
D. History of Syndication
While the real estate syndication industry got its start
in the years following World War II, the industry's infancy
developed in the 1960's. The RELP as an investment medium
became better understood and more widely available to the
broader investment community. In the early 1970s, the industry
grew tremendously with many inexperienced sponsors joining the
investment fray. The general recession of 1974-1975 forced an
industry shakeout and resulted in a consolidation of the market
among six sponsors -- Consolidated Capital, Balcor, Integrated
Resources, JMB Realty, Robert M. McNeil, and Fox & Carskadon.
By 1980, these firms were selling more than 50% of the total
public product by 1980.
The growth of syndication in the late 1970s occurred for
several reasons. First, rapid inflation combined with the
relatively poor performance of the stock and bond market
attracted investors to real estate. Second, the 1976 Tax
Reform Act and Revenue Act of 1978 imposed "at-risk"
limitations on most other tax shelter investment programs
13
except real estate and thus augmented interest in real estate
by tax-shelter seeking investors. Finally, the actual price
performance of real estate, especially housing prices, fueled
interest in the ownership of real estate assets, both as direct
investment and through securities, propelled the interest in
RELPs.
In the 1980s, the market exploded with sales of public
RELPs (those which are registered with the SEC) increasing in
every year until 1987. Part of this explosion resulted from
the additional tax sheltering benefits provided to real estate
due to the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA 81). While tax shelter worked its way into public deals
as a component of returns, private RELP (those partnerships not
required to register with the SEC) sales zoomed as sponsors
found tremendous demand by high-net worth individuals for
generous tax shelters created through highly leveraged
acquisitions. (The private RELPs could be structured more
flexibly than public deals to take greater advantage of tax
shelter benefits.) As the market grew, the number of sponsors
increased as well. The TRA of 1986 eliminated many of the
sheltering devices of previous years and forced another
shakeout in the industry. One author estimates that 25% to 30%
of the syndication firms existing in the early 1980s
disappeared as a result. 4 While many expect that the private
14
RELP market will remain dormant for the next several years, the
public RELP market will continue to survive, albeit in a
smaller form from the mid-1980s, by offering an array of
products to meet different investor objectives.
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CHAPTER TWO
UNDERSTANDING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS AS SECURITIES
A. The Real Estate Development Industry, Risk, and Value
Creation
The real estate development industry comprises a broad
range of activities which relate to the development,
construction, and management of land and buildings. In
particular, the value realized from the creation or ownership
of the real estate asset, a building or land, attracts the
investor. The product, whether developed or purchased,
requires a great deal of capital. It is the developer's need
for capital combined with the the investor's desire to own such
assets which defines the role of the syndicator. As a
financial intermediary, the syndicator brings together the
asset with the investor's capital and structures a security
which represents the investor's interest in some portion of the
asset. Before looking at the security itself, an understanding
of the value and risk in real estate development products needs
explanation.
16
The real estate industry, like any other business, is
fraught with risk. Risk can best be defined as the degree of
variability of achieving an expected rate of return. The most
common types of risk relevant to the industry are the
following: (1) business risk -- the risk of achieving expected
net income or capital gain because of changes in the real
estate marketplace, regulatory processes; (2) financial risk --
the risk of default on borrowed funds; and (3) inflation risk
-- the risk of losses in real value due to nominal changes in
price of goods and services. myjThese risks vary in magnitude
depending upon the stage of the development cycle. Plus, the
degree to which such risks can be mitigated impacts the
investor's potential for reward or failure. An examination of
the development process helps to explain some of these risks.
EXHIBIT 1 presents the general steps of the development
process involved with the creation of asset value. The process
begins with raw land acquisition and ends with a finished
building rented to tenants or held for sale. While this
exhibit outlines the development process from start to finish
in an abbreviated form, it is not necessary that all steps of
the process be followed by a single firm or individual. one
can enter or depart at any stage provided that a market exists
for the good to be acquired or sold.
17
EXHIBIT 2
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
AND
THE CORPORATE STOCK CERTIFICATE
Length of Life
Degree of Control
Liability
Management
Taxation
Form of Returns
Information Dessimination
Liquidity
Limited Partnership
Specified Duration
Very Limited
Limited to Investment
by Limited Partners;
Unlimited for
Seneral Partner
Centralized in General Partner
Individual Partnership Level
Only
Cash, Tax Benefits;
when and how distributed
specified in partnership
agreement
Very little, usually only
supplied by General Partner;
not followed by outside
analysts
No market for interests;
resale possible for certain
larger issues if followed
by funds which engage in
buying and selling interests
Stock Certificate
Infinite
No Limit
Limited to Investment
Centralized in Management
Corporate Level and
Individual Level for
Dividends Received
Vividends (Stock and Cash),
Appreciation in Stock Value;
not specified on when and how
distributed
Varies depending on capitalization
of the company; historical
information very accessible through
a number of sources; timely
If public, liquidity depends
on capitalization with increased
liquidity in larger issues or
those listed on
an exchange
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While the exhibit shows the steps involved, the risks
associated with completing each step cannot be easily
quantified. One way to think about the overall development
risk is to examine the relative distance each step in the
process goes towards bringing a project closer to its
self-supporting mode -- a leased or sold project. What must be
done to bring each step along to this project? What risks
exist in completing each stage successfully?
Raw land has no value other than what someone is willing
to pay for it. By itself, it provides the owner with a
negative return during any holding period due to the annual
expenditures necessary to retain ownership (e.g., property
taxes, debt service, etc.). Once the land is improved
(developed), one holds an asset much closer to the end result
and has completed one step in the overall development process.
This by itself creates value in the land. As one moves along
in the process, one draws closer to the bricks-and-mortar
product which produces operating revenues needed to generate an
investment return and pay back the development costs.
This model of value creation and risk works only for
development created in a vacuum. Market forces impact value,
both positively and negatively, over time. As a result, the
changes in risk in each step of the development process do not
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occur linearly because the environment in which development
occurs changes. Certainly, the risk in any one stage may
change as market forces impact value. Therefore, it may not
always be true that greater value can always be created the
closer one comes to the operating property. Even so, this
simple model explains the process in a way that is useful for
investors. For different real estate products, it is possible
to create investments with different levels of risk for all
parties: developer, investor, and syndicator. Obviously, the
least risky product would be structured based on the
acquisition of a fully-leased property. In order to see how
the syndication industry can create different investments from
different real estate products, one must understand the nature
of a syndication.
B. Real Estate Securities and Syndication
The Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
mention three concepts in defining a security: "certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement";
"investment contract", and; "instruments commonly known as a
'security'." The test for determining if a security exists
within these three concepts comes from a judicial
interpretation in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S.
20
837 (1975) which states that a security exists if there is "an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial
or managerial efforts of others." Limited partnerships
interests thus become securities as the limited partner invests
monies with the intention of receiving financial returns
without his involvement in the management or investment of such
monies. az/
Why securitize real estate? It allows for the investment
of funds with a reasonable expectation of return without the
requirement of management by such investors. Funds can thus be
aggregated from investors by those who provide the managerial
effort, the developer for example, to generate a return
thereon. From the investor's perspective, the security does
the following: 1) it allows for the investor to pool his
resources with those of others to invest in something he may
not have the management capabilities, resources, or time to do
by himself; 2) it limits the risk of his exposure to the value
of the security itself and not to the broader risks of the
activity; and 3) it allows him to value the security
independent of the underlying activity and sell the security if
a buyer can be found. For the user of capital, the developer
in the real estate industry, the issuance of securities
provides for the following: 1) assembly of capital necessary to
21
provide an activity; 2) selling of an equity interest in an
asset to others while maintaining managerial control; and 3)
mitigation of risk by reducing his own capital investment.
Real estate securities come in several forms. For the
real estate syndication industry, the limited partnership
interest serves as the security. Other forms include the Real
Estate Investment Trust (REIT), the Master Limited Partnership
(MLP), the common stock of real estate companies, the Comingled
Real Estate Fund (CREF), and various forms of securitized debt
instruments collateralized by real estate mortgages.
All of these securities share the same characteristic in
that they aggregate investor funds for investment in some
activity related to real estate. RELPs differ from the other
forms of real estate securites, though. First, the RELP is a
limited partnership and exists under statutes created in each
state and is governed under such laws. In general, a limited
partnership can engage in any legitimate activity. Second, for
federal tax purposes, it is not taxed as an entity; all income
and losses of the limited partnership. pass through the
partnership entity directly to the partners. Third, the
limited partner's liability is restricted to his partnership
investment provided the limited partner does not engage in the
management of the partnership.
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MLPs provide similar benefits as limited partnerships,
plus the partnership interests usually are listed on a
securities exchange. (There are restrictions on the activities
of the MLP to avoid taxation at the partnership level.) REITs
cannot actively manage their real estate assets and must
distribute a specified percentage of taxable income. CREFs are
generally oriented towards the larger pension fund investor and
are not marketed to the broader investing public.
Syndication is not a new idea. Identifying the beginning
of the concept of pooling investor resources cannot be
ascertained, but it was used as early as the 1920s to finance
many downtown highrises of that era. In its most general form
as the assemblage of capital resources for the purpose of
making an investment, then, any other method of assembling
capital for the purpose of making an investment could be termed
a syndication. The stock market, a liquid capital market,
essentially provides the same aggregation function without
intermediaries by allowing many individuals to own corporate
equity collectively. Corporations seek. equity capital by
issuing shares of stock using capital from investors to pursue
corporate goals. The success with which a corporation achieves
its corporate goals, increases it earnings and net assets,
reflects in changes in its stock price. Corporations also pay
23
dividends to stockholders which, in some cases, come from the
retained earnings. Yet, such dividends do not provide the sole
reason for holding stock. Investors also seek capital
appreciation through the rise in the stock's price. What sets
the syndication market apart from the stock market is the form
of ownership of the security held by the investor. Both are
equities, but in the corporation, the ownership takes the form
of the stock share certificate; in the syndication, ownership
takes the form of the limited partnership unit interest.
The distinctions between the corporate stock share and the
limited partnership unit interest are shown in EXHIBIT 2.
While this list is not definitive, it highlights the key
differences between the two forms of securities. The most
important difference relates to the method of taxation. As a
result of federal legislation, taxation occurs at the
individual level in the partnership, not at the corporate or
partnership level. Corporations pay taxes at the corporate
level and individuals pay taxes on any dividends received.
Therefore, partnerships act as conduits by passing through any
income, gains, or losses. Ideally, cash distribution in a
24
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partnership will at least cover the tax payment required by the
individual investor. To the extent that the income of the
partnership can be sheltered through non-cash expenses,
especially depreciation, the partnership can shelter a portion
or all of its cash earnings from taxation. For this reason,
asset ownership of existing property through the limited
partnership security makes sense as the preferred investment
vehicle. (It should also be noted that the benefits of the
investment can be more flexibly structured in the limited
partnership. Cash distributions, tax losses and income, and
capital gains can be segregated as separate benefits. As a
result of the TRA of 1986, there are several tests in
determining whether such allocations are tax abusive. If so,
the tax code now forces a reallocation of such benefits to
bring them in line with the economic effect of such
allocations.)
Of course, investor interest in a security depends upon
other characteristics other than merely the form of the
security. Achieving a suitable return from the security, all
things considered, must be an element in any investment
decision. To what extent does risk play as part of the
underlying investment? Is the investor compensated accordingly
for taking greater levels of risk? Does the time horizon of
realizing the return impact the value or return necessary from
26
such security? Liquidity of a security also must play a role
in determining value. Since no secondary market exists for
RELPs, how do RELP's returns offset the illiquidity of the
security?
C. Real Estate Syndications as Limited Partnerships
Generally, real estate assets are not held collectively
through stock ownership. Group ownership of income-producing
real estate assets is best accomplished through the partnership
form. While the limited partnership can raise upwards of
hundreds of millions of dollars, most RELPs remain small in
terms of total dollars sought and number of units outstanding.
Out of the 143 public offerings active in May, 1988, 121 (85%)
desired to raise $50 million or less exclusive of greenshoes.gj
(Greenshoe is an industry term for the general partner's option
to increase the size of the offering by some fixed amount
depending on market demand.) When purchased in unit sizes of
$1,000, the number of units available to trade becomes limited.
More important though, most public RELPs do not become fully
invested until several years after partnership formation. This
results from the time lag to raise all of the funds and to
acquire properties or other assets. If such partnerships could
issue "stock" that traded immediately, the "stock" would trade
at a significant discount given the lack of current earnings
27
and uncertainty as to future performance.
The partnership form of the security makes more sense for
real estate assets because there is no need to retain earnings
at the partnership level. The RELP acquires assets with either
equity or debt or some combination thereof. Once invested, all
earnings of the partnership can be distributed to the
investors; there is no need to increase or augment the net
worth at the partnership level to pursue additional activities
or increase the size of the RELP's assets. RELPs with
operating properties can be depreciated (even if it is not
truly reflective of the economic depreciation of the underlying
asset), and this non-cash expense can shelter income of the
partnership from taxes. This benefit can best be used at the
individual level in which the investor can take in cash which
is sheltered to some extent from taxation until the
depreciation runs out.
RELPs come in many forms. They differ in product type,
structure of balance sheet, offering terms, and expected
returns to the investors. Most RELPs have been set up with the
acquisition of operating properties as the principle objective.
The flexibility of the RELP form does not limit the purpose of
investment activity. Also, RELPs can develop land, develop
buildings, rehabilitate existing structures, and invest as
28
mortgagees to real property. The realm of possible activities
defies categorization. Chapter Four best describes the state
of the market for RELPs.
29
CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPMENT CYCLE AND REAL ESTATE RETURNS
A. Looking at the Risk Continuum
As explained in the previous chapter, the creation of real
estate product through the development cycle contains many
stages, each with varying degrees of risk. Certain risks are
uniform across product types, however, like lease-up or sales
risk and construction cost risk. To understand these risks and
their impact on returns, concepts from the available literature
are discussed.
The reward for taking on greater levels of risk should be
greater levels of return. Risk measures the variability of
cash flow (or some other measure of return) from an expected
rate of return. A U.S. Government security represents the
lease risky of possible investments based on a variability of
cash return. The cash flows received each year would be
consistent and predictable. This return would be considered
the risk-free rate. (This is not to say one does not take on
other kinds of risk in purchasing such a security, especially
30
the erosion in the real value of the return due to inflation or
the vagaries of the net value received if sold before
maturity.) Purchasing any other security in which the return is
not predictable, one should be compensated by a higher expected
return. Therefore, the expected return which exceeds the
risk-free rate for the same government security of the same
maturity can be termed as the risk premium return.
Investment in real estate securities must, therefore, have
a risk premium return due to the uncertainty of their cash
flows. Yet, the degree of uncertainty varies depending upon
the nature of the real estate collateralizing the security.
Acquiring a real estate security representing an interest in a
fully-leased, completed property has a different degree of
uncertainty than a security which represents an interest in a
development property not yet under construction. The expected
cash flow returns from these two different types of properties
certainly must have a considerable spread as measured by the
difference in the risk premium. One can calculate and
reasonably forecast with greater certainty, at least in the
short term, the returns from the fully-leased property, while
the return from the development property is more uncertain.
Furthermore, each stage of the real estate development
process should have a different risk premium. As one moves
31
farther from the completed development stage back towards the
raw land stage, the risk premium should increase
correspondingly. Land development should show the highest risk
premium. Ideally then, a portfolio of real estate securities
can be tailored to meet differing degrees of risk
acceptability.
What will be the marginal increase in risk premium for
securities representing different stages in the development
process? Can these differences be quantified? What do most
investors expect?
B. Review of Selected Literature Examining Investment
Performance of RELPs
Most articles examining the returns to investors in RELPs
only look at those partnerships which invest in properties at
the final stage of the development process -- the completed and
leased building. Given that the bulk of the RELP industry
invests in existing properties, this research effort is not
surprising. While the amount of literature is not extensive,
the conclusion reached by most researchers seems to indicate
that the returns, on a pre-tax basis, have not been very good.
A review of the thinking on real estate returns and returns
from RELPs follows.
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In 1976, Stephen Roulac, a noted researcher of the real
estate security industry, compared the returns of real estate,
in general, with those from common stock investments. He found
that the returns from real estate:
on balance, considering the literature on
investment returns, as well as evaluating the
inherent value generating capabilities of real
property, a realistic expectation as regards
realized rates of return for real estate investment
over time is in the 5% to 6% range. IV
In the same article, the author goes on to assert that real
estate, as "a class of investments should correspond closely to
the returns from the class of common stock investments." /The
author goes on to assert that given the comparable returns of
real estate with common stocks, the only benefit in investing
in real estate comes from the
greater predictability ... associated with real
estate investment returns than common stocks. Part
of this reduced risk is attributable to the basic
economic pattern of real property as compared to
the economic pattern of corporated enterprise, and
part is attributable to the enhanced dispersion of
results following from the securities form of
common stocks. Since returns from the two
investment classes over time will be comparable,
real estate merits an important role in ...
portfolios. Y/
Roulac limited his focus to a homogeneous group of real estate
products -- existing property already leased at the time of
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investment. In one sense, this result may only be indicative
of the returns for investment in this class of real estate and
not for investments in real estate products created earlier in
the development process.
What might investors expect from a real estate investment?
According to Roulac, most investors expect rates of return well
in excess of 10%. This result comes from the investment
community's lack of realism about returns for real estate,
often a result of the fact that accurate return data is
difficult to ascertain versus stock market performance. In
addition, the simplicity with which projected returns can be
arranged to show higher operating performance, also contributes
to the general investor naivete about expected returns.4
The article further suggests that most investors believe
real estate offers superior returns for some very simple
reasons:
1) Investors in risk investments expect to achieve
results superior to their perceptions of the "risk
free" rate;
2) Investors are naturally optimistic believing either
that they possess superior expertise and/or
investment conditions in the future will be better
than they have been in the past;
3) Many investors are naive and lack the analytical
ability and insights necessary to have an informed
judgment as to what a reasonable return expectation
consists of;
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4) The small group of investors who do possess insight
into the level of reasonable expectations, for
competitive reasons, may seek to influence market
perceptions of returns in order to obtain the best
terms when buying or selling; and
5) The marketing pressures of seeking new investment
management business and retaining existing business
cause many to "oversell" the level of returns that
can reasonably be achieved. SJ
Research into the returns of RELPs to investors also
indicates that returns are quite low, considerably less than
the 10% expectation level. In an article published in 1985,
Rogers and Owers examined the returns from 32 public
partnerships formed in the 1970s which included both tax- and
income-oriented offerings. They discovered that pre-tax
returns to the limited partners in income-oriented partnerships
(i.e., those not organized for the purpose of creating
tax-shelter) were extremely low, less than 1% on a pre-tax
basis in a sample of seven public syndications of the whole
group..YHowever, their analysis does not include the residual
value of the property at the time the return calculation is
made. Even so, this research shows that the current return to
the investor in income-oriented RELPs has been quite low.
One possible explanation for the poor performance of some
income-oriented partnerships may be the unreal expectations of
property income made by syndicators. In another study, two
researchers compared the projected returns in 1983, the year of
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the offerings, with the actual returns in 1985 for 39 offerings
by five different sponsors. They discovered that in four out
of five cases, the projected net operating income exceeded the
actual results. While not expected to correlate precisely, the
actual results varied greatly, from 25% to 120% of projected
values. The reason for the results stem from wide differences
in both revenues and expenses from projected levels, especially
on the expense side of the income stream. If anything, the
results suggest a possible explanation for low current returns
of many income-oriented syndications -- the expected results
from operations cannot be accurately estimated by syndicators
when organizing RELPs. 7Y
These findings would lead the reader to believe that
investing in real estate is equivalent to investing in common
stock except that one might expect a greater predictability of
returns from the real estate. This finding does little to shed
light upon the makeup of such real estate investments. There
should be a greater expected return from a development-oriented
security versus one made in an existing property given the
corresponging risk profiles. The question remains what might
be an acceptable level of return for securities acquired
representing different stages of the development process and
their inherent risk?
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While real estate investors may overstate the expected
returns from investment, this group does understand that risk
premiums increase as one moves further back in the development
process. For development projects, i.e., those requiring
investment prior to project completion, investors typically
look for a return on invested funds between 20% to 30%
calculated as an internal rate of return (IRR). 8 For
investments in raw land development, the returns expected
should be even greater, in excess of 25%, according to one land
syndicator.
C. Model for Evaluating Risk/Return Structures
Based upon the previous discussion, the investment return
of securities representing interests in differing stages of the
real estate development process should offer increasingly
higher yields. Before looking at actual performance returns,
an examination of the components of the return and the method
by which returns should be calculated is presented.
The basis used to analyze returns examines only actual
cash invested and distributed and the timing factor which
separates the investment and return. Returns can also include
tax benefits but, for the purposes herein, these will be
ignored. Investment in RELPs rarely provides a 100%
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pass-through of funds into the acquired asset. Typically, the
sponsor of the RELP claims a certain amount of the invested
funds as fees for providing various services to the
partnership. These fees range greatly, anywhere from 5% to 30%
or more. Therefore, the invested dollars going into the
underlying real estate asset are less than 100% of funds
invested. Returns, however, are calculated on the total
dollars invested in the partnership.
On-going cash generation becomes the source of return
other than tax benefits. This results from the operation of an
existing property which throws off cash, after satisfaction of
the debt service, if any, which gets distributed to the
investors. Such cash generation can only come from those deals
in which the project reaches the last stage of the development
cycle. Therefore, this component of returns will not be found
for any other security created earlier in the development
process. (The one exception may be the land development
situation in which the land receives rent from a source,
agriculture for example, prior to undergoing physical
development.)
The second component of the return comes from the sale of
the property asset or another capital event such as
refinancing. As stated before, whereas a sale can occur
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between any stage of the development cycle, other capital
events, primarily refinancing, are limited to those projects in
operation. In any case, capital events occur infrequently and
usually signal the dissolution of the partnership. The impact
of a capital event on returns is most unpredictable at the
outset of a real estate investment. It would be incomplete to
compare returns from RELPs without including this component
return, however.
In evaluating returns, each component of return has a
timing element. Cash from operations may be distributed on an
annual basis whereas a capital event is, most likely, a
one-time occurence which might occur several years after the
initial investment. This timing difference impacts the returns
when using an IRR return measure due to the reinvestment rate
problem. Instead, the method should evaluate returns above a
risk-free rate. To do this, a discounted cash flow analysis is
followed. Cash flows and capital events are discounted over a
given period at the risk-free rate (U.S. Government Security
of comparable maturity). The discounted value of this fund
flow (net of the investment amount) is then divided by the
initial investment amount. The result can be thought of as a
risk-premium profitability index (PI) and provides a method for
comparing returns of different investments which may have
timing differentials between returns.
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EXHIBIT 3 shows the impact of timing differences in terms
of measuring returns of a $10,000 investment for hypothetical
returns of a development and acquisition investment. As shown,
the difference in the returns can be dramatic as in the case of
the development security. The acquisition security shows that
the projected return is lower when using this NPV method of
calculating returns versus IRR. The value gained by using this
method of calculating returns yields information as to the
extent the investment exceeds the risk-free premium. If the
profitability index is positive, the return on the investment
exceeds the risk-free rate, and the difference between the two
rates equals the profitablity of the investment above the
risk-free rate. As shown, the profitability of the development
security exceeds a 100% return while the acquisition security
only exceeds the risk-free rate by slightly more than 10%, an
amount hardly making this hypothetical investment worthwhile.
In getting to a model for thinking about risk/return
structures, it is fair to assert that the risk premium for
RELPs offerings backed by different property characteristics
should offer increasingly greater returns. Of course, this may
be a slight over-simplification of real world situations.
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EXHiBIT 3
COMPARISON OF RETURNS UNDER DIFFERENT EVALUATION CRITERIA
Development
Security
Acquisition
Security
Hypothetical Cash Streams
Investment ($10,000)
$0
$25,000
($10,000)
$500
$600
$700
$750
$900
$950
$15,000
Internal Rate of Return: 11.4%
A. Risk-Free Rate:
B. NPV of Cash Stream
(at risk-free rate)
Profitability index
7.50%
3-year period
$10,124
9.50%
7-year period
$1,081
0.1081.012
Profitability index calculated as follws:
1) Figure PV of positive cash flows using risk-free rate
for a given 3aturity;
2) Subtract original investment from PV value; and
3) Divide result of Step 2 by original investment amount.
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Original
Year i
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Certain factors can mitigate risk in any stage of the
development cycle and need to be accounted for when thinking of
returns. For example, a significant portion of the risk in
building development -- lease-up risk -- disappears once the
building becomes pre-leased. If so, this reduced risk element
needs to be factored into the expected returns of the RELP.
Obviously, the returns should be less due to less exposure to
lease-up risk.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE MARKET FOR REAL ESTATE PARTNERSHIPS
A. Investment Market Segments
one author estimates that the total value of commercial
real estate in the United States equals $2.6 trillion of which
$800 billion represents debt. jThis means that the remainder,
or $1.8 trillion, is held as equity investment in such
commercial property. Yet, in the last decade or so, the total
amount of equity funds raised by syndicators both public and
private amounts to little more than $ 60 billion since 1970 as
shown in EXHIBIT 4. This suggests that the total dollars
raised since 1970 represents less than three percent of the
total value of commercial real estate in the U. S. today. If
just public syndication of equity are considered, then the
percentage of the total investment in commercial property is
less than two percent. In actuality, the percentages are even
lower since not all of the dollars raised by the syndicators go
into the asset. One can conclude from this analysis that the
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EXHIBIT 4
REAL ESTATE FUND SALES SINCE 1970
($ 000,000s)
Public Offerings of RELPs
Highly Low Mortgage
Leveraged Leveraged Loan
918
2,415
2,322
2,381
2,550
1,492
1,200
933
6r38
3,874
L,516
2,690
1,953
921
456
325
250
100
1,846
2,245
1,902
939
875
317
75
N/A
N/A
(No Discrete Data for this Per
Total
MLPs Public
463 7,101
972 8,148
200 7,114
5,273
4,346
2,265
1,600
1,183
738
580
342
147
iod) 87
76
134
107
68
14
Total $14,849 $13,085 $8,199 $1,635 $39,323 $21,651 $60,974
Notes:
Highly Leveraged -
Low Leveraged -
Mortgage Loan -
Leverage for more than 50% of total
asset purchase
Leverage less than or equal to 50% of
total asset purchase
RELPs organized for the purpose of
making mortgages on existing properties.
in 1987, the SEC no longer required sales date on Form D
thus making it difficult to estimate the size of the
private syndication market going forward. it is well
known within the industry that the private market suffered
serious decline in sales in 1987. Some estimate that the
sales for 1987 declined by more than 50% from the
previous year's level.
Source; Robert A. Stanger & Co.
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1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
Total
Private
RELPs
N/A
2,650
4,682
5,308
3,983
1,647
1,066
788
492
387
228
100
58
48
89
70
45
10
Total
Public
and
Private
Market
N/A
10,798
11,796
10,581
8,329
3,912
2,666
1,971
1,230
967
570
247
145
124
223
177
11
24
syndication market is not a significant factor in the overall
ownership of commercial property. Its potential, though,
appears tremendous.
EXHIBIT 4 also illustrates the rapid growth in the
industry in the 1980s as compared with the 1970s. In part, the
ERTA of 1981, with its liberal depreciation deductions and
other tax-sheltering devices, helped to stimulate the interest
in real estate for the individual investor according to sources
familiar with the industry. In addition, the increase in
interest can also be traced to the greater effort of
syndicators, both public and private, to sell such benefits to
the investor marketplace. Yet, with the passage of the TRA of
86, the market for such offerings declined considerably,
especially within the private placement market, due to the
elimination of much of the tax-shelter aspects of real estate
investment.
Public vs. Private
Because limited partnership interests are considered
securities, their issuance, sale, and transfer are subject to
federal and state security laws. ,/The federal securities laws
are administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and are designed to protect the investor by requiring the
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sponsor of such securities to make a full and fair disclosure
of all pertinent facts material to making an informed
investment decision. The laws do not provide for the SEC to
advise upon the merits of any investment whatsoever.
The SEC and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provide
for exemption from registration where the benefit to the public
provided by registration is too remote. The rules for
exemption from registration are found within Section 4(2) which
guides offerings within those parties clearly able to fend for
themselves (i.e., offerings made to substantial investors like
major corporations), and within Regulation D (promulgated by
the SEC in 1982) which governs offerings limited in
distribution. (Intrastate offerings are also exempt.) In all
cases, full disclosure of material information relevant to
making an investment decision is required whether or not exempt
from registration. Quite simply then, those offerings which
require registration with the SEC are considered "public
offerings," all others are considered "private offerings."
Compliance with the requirements of Regulation D
determines those RELPs which need not register with the SEC.
The central concept in compliance with this regulation revolves
around the restriction in sales of such securities to
non-accredited investors. In general, such securities may not
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be sold to more than 35 investors who fail to meet the
standards of an accredited investor as defined within Reg D.
(Note: Offerings in which less than $500,000 is raised from
investors are exempt regardless of the level of sophistication
or number of investors provided no general solicitation takes
place.) In the event that any interests are sold to
non-accredited investors, a full disclosure of information as
required in a public offering must be made. In all cases, a
notice of sale must be made with the SEC.
The definition of an accredited investor depends upon
highly technical definitions and changes often, but generally
means those investors of significant net worth (over $1 million
exclusive of home and automobiles) or income (in excess of
$200,000 for the previous two years and expectations of the
same amount for the current year). Determination of whether
any investor meets the requirements of accreditation rests with
the sponsor of the security.
As a result of the exemption requirements, two markets for
RELPs have developed -- public and private. Because public
RELPs must go through the registration process, information
describing these offerings has been tracked by a number of
organizations, predominantly the Shrewsbury, New Jersey-based
Robert A. Stanger Company. Private offerings skirt the
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registration process and information concerning the types of
offerings does not come under public scrutiny. Although the
amount raised by private offerings has been known in the past
through Form D filings, exact figures are not available
currently because the sponsor needs now only specify the amount
intended to be raised, not the amount actually raised.
Blind Pool versus Specified Property
When organizing the RELP, the sponsor need not determine
specific properties that will comprise the assets of the
partnership upon capitalization. (The general partner must
identify the purpose for which the funds raised will be
employed, however.) In these cases, sponsors term the offering
as a "blind-pool". The investor relies upon the wisdom and
experience of the general partner is selecting the portfolio
after the funds have been raised. This term can also apply to
those partnerships where some assets have been identified for
investment but do not equal the total funds raised. This
contrasts with the "specified" offering in which the deployment
of partnership funds has been identified prior to the offering.
Public offerings tend to be "blind-pools" (approximately
75%) while private offerings are almost always "specified".
Because public offerings allow for solicitation to a broader
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market base, the amount raised by such offerings tends to be
larger than those of private offerings. (In part, the costs of
a public offering run in the hundreds of thousand dollar range
thereby necessitating a larger amount of funds be raised in
order to amortize such costs. Also, since the investors in
such public offerings need not be accredited, the smallest unit
size or partnership interest tends to be in smaller
denominations usually in the $1,000 to $5,000 range.) For
example, in January, 1985, the average public offering
available equaled $47 million. ,/With such a large pool of
potential funds combined with the uncertainty of whether or not
the entire offering will be sold, most public syndicators
cannot identify asset acquisitions until well into or after the
offering period. On the other hand, almost all private
offerings are specified prior to the offering. Sponsors of
private offerings generally seek fewer investors and raise
smaller dollar amounts thus making it almost a necessity to
have identified the target acquisition prior to the offering.
This results from the limited distribution of the private
offering and its sizable partnership unit sizes (usually
between $10,000 and $50,000).
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Tax Shelter versus Economic
The ERTA of 1981 incorporated tax incentives that allowed
real estate deals to be structured for substantial tax-losses
without incurring cash drains upon the investors. This led to
the explosive growth of the private syndication market as
sponsors rushed to produce product for the high net worth
individuals who could benefit most from the tax losses. These
deals tended to be highly leveraged with tax write-offs often
exceeding two dollars for every dollar invested. The TRA of
1986 eliminated many of the tax breaks and caused a large
disruption in the overall sales levels of private deals
beginning even prior to enactment of the law. The public
market, while affected, suffered less as most public deals were
not motivated by tax-shelter investment. (This resulted partly
from the economic base of the investor pool and also because
public offerings could not permit staged pay-in periods for
investors. Staged pay-ins provided partners in private deals
the ability to offset the investment amount each year with
annual tax savings created by excess losses. Beginning in
1986, public partnerships could offer staged pay-ins on a
limited basis, however.)
Most recently, public deals have trended towards low
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leveraged or all-cash investment and acquisition in an attempt
to increase current income. (See EXHIBIT 5.) For example, in
1982, 76% of the equity RELPs (by dollars raised) used debt for
more than 50% of the total consideration in the acquisition of
assets. By 1987, the percentage of total RELP equity deals
using high leverage dropped to less than 20%. The use of
leverage decreases the amount of cash flow immediately
available to the investor because of debt service. (Most real
estate deals organized during the 1980s, if leveraged, were
negatively leveraged meaning that the cost of financing
exceeded the capitalization rate of the investment. Thus, the
use of leverage in these cases automatically decreases the
investors' return on investment at the start of an investment
program.) Those deals where the primary component of return is
cash distributions are considered economic deals.
Whether public or private, tax or economic deals, RELP
interests, as a security, are not very liquid. According to
George Hamilton, President of the National Partnership
Exchange, "the pressure for liquidity in RELP markets is low,
less than 1% of limited partners liquidate in any given year."
fNo markets exist for the exchange of these securities,
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EXHIBIT 5
PUBLICLY REGISTERED EQUITY RELP SALES BY AMOUNT OF LEVERAGE
1982-1987
($ 000,000s)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
HIGHLY - LEVERAGED
LOW - LEVERAGED
TOTAL EQUITY PARTNERSHIPS
1,492.0 2,549.8 2,380.9 2,321.7 2,414.8 918.4
1,953.3 2,890.1
1,948.2 3,470.7
,438.1 3,874.2
4.334.2 5,211.8 5,902.9 4,792.6
Percentage Distribution
HIGHLY - LEVERAGED
LOW - LEVERAGED
76.6 73.5 54.9% 44,5T 40.9X 19.2%
23.4% 26.5% 45.1% 55.5 59.1% 80.8%
1 /. a 100.v A 0 .0 1 . 10 . V 10 .IOTAL EQUITY PARTNERSHiP;
Notes:
Highly - Leveraged:
Low - Leveraged:
Leverage in excess of 504 cf total
asset purchase.
Leverage equal to or lEss than
50% of total asset purchase.
Source: Robert A. Stanger & Co.
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although there are several organizations which buy and sell
interests in addition to firms which make a listing of buyers
and sellers. 5/It is not expected that any markets for
partnership units will develop due to the problems in
evaluating the existing status of any partnership- and the cost
in disseminating such information. (There are some
partnerships which have been "rolled-up" into a Master Limited
Partnership which do trade on securities exchanges. Usually
this involves the combination of one sponsor's existing
partnerships into one MLP. Whether or not more sponsors engage
in this activity remains to be determined.)
B. Real Estate Products and Investor Preferences
EXHIBIT 6 details the composition of public RELPs by real
estate product since 1981. Information for making this table
comes from the description of the stated objectives of the
syndication offerings. Commercial/Residential, consistently
the largest category with more than 25% of the offerings in
each year, suggests that most public syndications do not
discriminate whether or not the ultimate asset portfolio will
include commercial or residential properties. This category
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EXHIBIT 6
COMPOSITION BY PROPERTY TYPE FOR PUBLICLY REGISTERED OFFERINGS
1981 - 1987
($ 000,000s)
DOLLAR SALES VOLUMES
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Commercial/Residential
Commercial
Residential
Subsidized Housing
Mini-Warehouse
Commercial Net Lease
Hotels/Motels
Mobile Homes
Total Sales
603.6
356.2
342.9
66.0
32.3
38.5
1*1
1,512.5
856.5
270.9
390.0
107.3
100.3
173.1
47.1
1.
1,948.2
1,533.1
788.6
583.0
168.0
164.1
182.6
51.1
0.2
3,470.7
2,263.8
857.9
431.6
196.1
278.0
244.6
54.6
7.6
4,334.2
2,525.7
1,362.2
311.6
98.6
481.0
303.5
100.5
28.7
5,211.8
2,224.9
1,833.2
318.1
33.2
396.8
727.6
331.6
37.5
5,902.9
1,286.5
1,493.9
973.1
23.0
196.8
378.6
358.2
82.5
4,792.6
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Commercial/Residential
Commercial
Residential
Subsidized Housing
Mini-Warehouse
Commercial Net Lease
Hotels/Motels
Mobile Homes
39.9X
23.6 %
22L.. 7
4.4%
4.8%.
2. 0%
***
100V.0 O
44.O.
13.9%
20.0%
5.5%
5.1%
8,97.
2. 4"
0. 2%
100. 
44.2%
22.7%
16,8%.
4. 81
4. 7%
0.0X
100.0%
52.2X
19.87
4.51Z
6.4
5.67.
0.21
100 .0 O
48.5.
26. 1%
6.0 7
1.9%
9. 2X
5. 87.
1.9%
0. 67
100. 0I
37. 77.
31. I%
5.4%
0.67.
6.7%
12. 3'
5.6%
0.1
100.. 
Note:
- included in Residential category
Source: Robert A. Stanger & Co.
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26.8.
31. 2X
0. 51
4.1%
7.97.
7.
1.7X
100.0OX
includes all kinds of commercial properties -- office
buildings, industrial buildings, and retail centers -- as well
as any kind of residential property, generally apartments and
mobile homes. In one sense, this latitude allows the sponsor
to invest in a broad range of property types. In the past
several years, the percentage composition of the total market
shows a decline in interest for RELPs seeking to invest in both
commercial and residential properties within the same
partnership. Rather, the percentages indicate a trend towards
greater definition in the type of property acquired. Between
1986 and 1987, Commercial/Residential category slipped
considerably by 40% while Residential-only programs gained over
200% in sales. Barbara Pivnica, a consultant with Roulac
Consulting, believes that the trend towards more specification
within public programs as to both property type and identified
properties will become more common. Syndicators will find it
easier to sell a program that details more specifics of the
investment orientation.
Programs which invest in specific property types make up
the remaining categories. The commercial net lease programs
experienced considerable attention in 1986 as syndicators
rushed to develop passive income programs. These commercial
net lease programs acquire only properties leased on a
triple-net basis to tenants, generally property with single
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tenants such as fast-food outlets with little or no leverage.
As a result, these programs throw-off cash distributions
immediately and little or no tax benefits. Subsidized housing
RELPs suffered a considerable drop in total sales from a high
of $194 million in 1984 to only $23 million in 1987. Yet,
public syndicators claim that investors now clamor for this
product today given certain tax shelter benefits remaining with
this investment.
Investors do not exhibit a consistent appetite for a
"typical" product offering. The sudden shifts in product
offerings between categories may indicate that investors for
public product do not discriminate greatly between product
types; instead, the product bought might be in response to a
"herd" mentality among investors to respond to the current
"hot" product pushed by sales agents. In one sense, investors
may only be looking for a specific kind of return offered --
growth, current income, or tax shelter -- and do not really pay
any attention to the underlying asset.
Determining the investor base for public limited
partnerships defies analysis. The single most difficult
problem stems from the fact that each and every sponsor
maintains that such information describing the investor base is
proprietary in nature and should not be disclosed. Sales of
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RELPs remain an important asset type for investors. According
to a report in The Stanger Register in January, 1986, which
summarized a 1985 survey of broker/dealers, RELPs made up more
than 40% of the average client's portfolio in 20% of the firms
surveyed. For more than half of the firms surveyed, RELPs made
up more than 25% of the average client's portfolio. Of those
seeking investment in RELPs, more than 50% of the investor base
seeks income- or growth-oriented partnerships when considering
partnership investments. The balance desired tax-sheltering
partnerships, although the trend among investors in 1985 seemed
to be moving away from tax-shelter products. Sixty-nine
percent of the firms surveyed indicated that clients wanted
income products and 25% of the firms signaled a trend toward
growth products. ,W
The composition of returns to the investor becomes the
item of significance when thinking about the real estate
product. Can investor preferences be met by constructing a
variety of partnership offerings? For example, those investors
desiring current income, the acquisition of existing properties
for all-cash (unleveraged) might be most suitable. For those
investors willing to take more risk, the growth type
partnership such as those involving some degree of value-added
enhancements (e.g., development offerings) might be more
suitable. Based on the historical record presented in EXHIBIT
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7, investors appear to prefer to invest in RELPs which intend
to acquire existing properties. These syndications accounted
for more than 80% of all offerings since 1983. Whether this
will continue in light of the historical performance of such
offerings remains to be determined.
C. Sponsor Types
RELPs simply would not exist without the motivation of
entrepreneurial firms to risk the capital needed to organize
the partnership, especially public deals. The primary
motivation for such sponsors has been the potential for sizable
fees which come from the front-end load of the partnership.
According the Robert Stanger Co., these fees traditionally have
been anywhere from 18% to 30% of the total capital raised. j/A
portion of these fees repay sponsors for the costs of
assembling and organizing the partnership, yet a good part,
probably over 50%, represent profit to the sponsor. As the
industry has matured, the amount of compensation to the sponsor
has decreased since 1985, as shown in EXHIBIT 8, with a typical
front-end load today of less than 20%. (Note: EXHIBIT 8 shows
the relative sponsor compensation according to Stanger Co.'s
ranking system.)
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EXHIBIT 7
PUBLIC EQUITY PARTNERSHIPS BY REAL ESTATE ACTIVITY
1983-1988
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Total Program Offerings
Intent to Invest in:
Existing
Existing i To Be Built
Under Construction / To Be Built
To Be Built
96 130 144 188 180
74 98 106
15 12 19
i 3 5
6 17 14
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total Program Offerings
Intent to Invest in:
Existing
Existing / To Be Built
Under Construction / To Be Built
To Be Built
100% 100% 100'/. 160% 100% 100%
777
17.
6%
75%
914
I.
1 3%
74%
I3%
107.
77 %
12%
9%
78%
3111%!
717.
11%
4%
Note:
Data based on Stanger Partnership Listings of currently
offered equity partnerships as of May for each year.
Includes specified programs.
Source: Robert A. Stanger & Co.
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143
102
16
6
19
144
22
5
14
140
15
50
20
1988
EXHIBIT 8
COMPARISON OF
RELATIVE SPONSOR COMPENSATION LOAD
. 1985 versus 1988
Ratings
AAA+ - AA+
Number Percentage
1988
1987
1986
1985
77
64
49
44.171
28.88%
23. 71
Ratings
AA - BBB
Number
81
121
106
Percentag
46.5%
55.9%
71.2%
76.37.
Explanation:
The Robert A. Stanger Company rates RELP offerings according to
risk and offering terms. This rating measures the investor's
share of partnership returns assuming uniform economic performance.
AAA+ rated partnerships are most favorable to the investor, FBB
rated partnerships are least favorable. Only equity partnerships
offered in March of each year are included in this table.
This merely serves as a representative sample. Ratings for
offerings at other times of the year might show slight variations
but would only be indicative of a different stage of
this same trend.
Source: Robert A. Stanger & Company
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The interesting question of fee load relates to its impact
upon investor returns. Clearly, if a sponsor takes out 25% of
all investment dollars for an all-equity acquisition, then the
sponsor must ensure that the properties acquired must increase
in value by at least that amount in order for the investor to
break-even on a return-of-capital basis. For leveraged
acquisitions, the amount of increase need not be as
significant. How this will impact the overall return to the
investor cannot be determined without an evaluation comparing
investment returns with and without the fee compensation to the
sponsor. It suffices to state that, ceteris paribus, investor
returns should increase as the overall compensation to the
sponsor decreases.
Selling the real estate partnership interest becomes the
primary objective of the sponsor once the RELP has been
organized. Because the interest is considered a security, only
NASD broker/dealers are permitted to sell these interests. As
a result, the regional and national brokerage firms sell the
bulk of such securities today. Yet, in the early part of the
1980s, sponsors often organized their own securities firms to
distribute such securities directly to investors. As a result,
the Wall Street brokerage firms have increased their presence
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in the creation and sales of RELPs given their existing network
of brokerage outlets. This trend, shown in EXHIBIT 9,
illustrates the relative change in rankings of the top ten
sellers of RELPs between 1981 and 1988. These firms have
realized that their ability to distribute product places them
in the best position to assemble and sell their own product
instead of selling the product of others. According to John
Gagliano of PaineWebber Properties, "it was only a matter of
time until the Wall Street houses woke up and realized that
they could assemble and sell partnerships as well as anyone.
That's why we have become more aggressive in this market." B
The sponsor, being the general partner of the RELP,
controls the management of the partnership and must make all
investment decisions. Organizing and registering the
partnership, selling the partnership units, and acquiring
suitable investment properties constitute the three roles which
the sponsor must successfully complete to realize the ultimate
aim of the RELP. To organize the partnership, the sponsor must
assemble an offering memorandum which describes all material
facts and risks pertinent to achieving the purpose of the RELP.
This document can be hundreds of pages and often involves the
work of several professional consultants, especially legal and
accounting services. Upon completion of this document, the
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EXHIBIT 9
HISTORICAL RANKINS OF RELP SPONSORS BY SALES VOLUME
1991 - 1987
($ 000,OOOs)
1981 1983 1985 1987
Sponsor Name Rank Sales Rank Sales Rank Sales Rank Sales
JMB Realty Corp. 1 $196.2 2 $551.0 2 $610.0 1 $585.0
Prudential-Bache X * * * 2 $489.8
Krupp Corporation * * * 3 $475.0
Shearson Lehman X * * * 4 $322.0
C.R.I. Inc. * * * 5 $307.3
Integrated Resources 7 $62.3 9 $150.7 5 $335.0 6 $272.5
E.F. Hutton X 6 $64.7 * 7 $268.6
Dean Witter X * * * 8 $251.4
Balcor 2 $135.9 1 $581.5 1 $834.8 9 $193.1
PaineWebber X * * 10 $176.0
Merrill Lynch X * 4 $261.2 3 $500.0
American ist Capital Assoc. * $167.4 4 $379.4 *
Oxford Development * * 6 $324.2 *
Franchise Finance Corp. * 10 $150.0 7 $301.8 *
Consolidated Capital 4 $87.0 3 $272.9 8 $282.8 *
Public Storage 5 $65.9 * 9 $281.3 *
Fox & Carskadon 3 $129.0 5 $201.4 10 $239.6 *
Equitec Financial Group 9 $46.4 6 $175.4 * *
Winthrop Corp. * 6 $165.7 * *
Shelter Realty Corp. 8 $49.5 * * *
National Partnership Corp. 10 $41.0 * * *
Notes:
* - Not ranked within top ten sponsors.
X - Wall Street Brokerage
Source: Robert A. Stanger & Company
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partnership must be registered with the SEC and in any states
in which it will be sold. (In the case of the individual
states, the offering memorandum must meet any applicable state
"blue-sky" requirements prior to sale.) These requirements
often involve considerable time and expense, mostly legal
assistance, to insure that the offering meets all such imposed
requirements for disclosure as well as filed with all
appropriate governing agencies.
Several considerations are involved when contemplating the
organization of the RELP. First, the sponsor must have some
belief that the security created can and will be sold to
investors. A track record of successfully organizing and
selling RELPs helps. Second, the sponsor, if a corporation,
must meet certain minimum net worth requirements imposed by the
IRS to insure that the organization formed will be taxed as a
partnership. (Revenue Procedure 72-13 spells out these
requirements. Essentially, a corporation have a net worth
equivalent to 10% or more of the total contributions to the
partnership if such contributions exceed $2,500,000. (Revenue
Procedure 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735) Failure to reach this
minimum may involve the reclassification of the partnership as
a corporation thereby denying the benefits of partnership for
tax purposes. Third, the sponsor must be able to fund the cost
of organizing the partnership. These costs can run several
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hundred thousand dollars or more for a public offering
depending upon the anticipated geography of distribution.
To sell the securities, a sponsor can organize his own
distribution network or sell interests through other sources,
most notably national and/or regional brokerage firms.
Insurance companies, through their network of agents, also sell
RELPs though to a lesser extent than the brokerage firms. The
standard fee for selling partnership interests is 8% of the
funds raised. Brokerage firms and other firms which sell RELPs
often perform extensive due diligence on a sponsor prior to
qualifying the sponsor's offerings for sale. Of course, no
guarantees exist that a sales organization will take on a new
sponsor. Given that the brokerage firms have become more
involved in creating proprietary product, the more difficult it
may become for new sponsors to sell through this channel.
Besides organizing the RELP, the sponsor manages the
partnership and, in some cases, directly manages the properties
acquired as well. Typically, the largest non-Wall Street firms
provide their own property management through subsidiary
management companies. The Wall Street sponsors utilize outside
property management services to perform the daily management
responsibilities. An interesting question raised by this
distinction centers on whether the investor does better when
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the sponsor provides direct property
contracting with third-party vendors?
management versus
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXAMINING THE HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE RECORD
A. Examining the Returns
Investors have bought RELP's for a number of years, and,
after a solid record of growth since 1981, market sales have
declined. While the TRA of 1986 dampened investor appetite due
to the change in the tax treatment of income and losses, a
potentially bigger reason for the decline may be due to
negative investor perceptions of the actual return received by
investing in these deals. One author writes that "these
investor perceptions are the result of the non-performance of
many real estate syndications and a great deal of negative
publicity about syndicated real estate and overbuilt markets."
According to John Rosek of New England Securities, many
RELPs failed to perform as anticipated, mostly due to the high
prices paid for the property and the severe economic
dislocations in several parts of the country, especially in
Texas. In addition, he feels that investors forgot that a
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percentage of the anticipated return included some tax-shelter
benefits, something that went away with the 1986 Tax Reform
Act. The combination of these two factors lead to a general
disillusionment with these investments.
PaineWebber Properties prepared a booklet outlining the
returns to the limited partners for all of the RELPs sold
through their agents from 1979. j/While not comprehensive, the
does provide data on cumulative distributions
operations and sales or refinancing since the inception of each
partnership through the end of 1986. This information comes
directly from the sponsors themselves, and in some cases,
includes performance on RELPs not sold by PaineWebber. Quite
frankly, the returns to the investors appear slim at best for
those partnerships organized after 1980. For example, out of
the 15 public equity partnerships organized by Balcor from 1981
forward, only five had made any cash distributions to the
investors by the end of 1986. (Balcor may have organized other
partnerships during this period but only those included in this
report by PaineWebber are represented. The RELPs included here
were for the leveraged acquisition of income-producing
properties, both residential and commercial.) For those RELPs
that made distributions, only one returned 5% on an annual
basis including distributions from sales or refinancing of
properties! Excluding distributions made from sales or
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booklet from
refinancing, the average annual return for those partnerships
making distributions equalled less than 2%.
While the objective of these partnerships was to provide
short-term tax benefits and long-term appreciation, the value
of the cash distributions is minimal as a component of return.
This shows that these deals are uneconomic and serve as
evidence why investors have become disillusioned. It should be
stated that the RELPs organized in the 1970's appear to have
performed somewhat better. This most likely resulted from the
lower tax-shelter incentives of this period and because of the
maturing of the properties during the inflationary period of
the late 1970s. The best performing partnership, Balcor Income
Properties, organized in 1977, has returned 7% on invested
funds annually and has completely returned the original
investment to the limited partners. This partnership has only
one of its original fourteen properties remaining in its
portfolio which, according to the limited information, appears
to be having problems in leasing and occupancy and will not
enhance the overall return.
The Carlyle RELPs organized by JMB, one of the largest
sponsors during the 1980s perform no better than those of
Balcor. This series of RELPs are more risk-oriented because
they involve investments in properties under development or
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newly constructed. Even so, not one partnership out of six
organized after 1980 has returned more than 1% on invested
funds through December, 1986. Of the 10 organized prior to
1981, two had sold all of their investments by the end of 1986.
These two partnerships, organized in 1971 and 1972, returned
$766 and $623 from operations and $2,604 and $3,212 of sales
proceeds respectively for each $1,000 of investment. As
presented, this translates to an average annual return of 15.8%
and 20.2% from operations and sales proceeds respectively.
Yet, this return proves deceiving because it is calculated by
taking the overall return and dividing it by the number of
years of partnership operation. on a compounded basis, the
returns are quite different. Assuming that the proceeds from
operations were distributed at the middle of the partnership
lives and sales proceeds at the end, the compound return or IRR
for the 1971 fund equals 9.8% and, for the 1972 fund, 11.4%.
Because the actual timing of the returns is not known, the real
return may be better or worse than the above figures. Assuming
the returns from operations and distributions occurred
uniformly over time, then the IRR for the 1971 and 1972 fund
would equal 21.2% and 26.4% respectively. If all the
distributions came at the end in 1986, however, the IRR would
drop dramatically to 8.4% and 10.1% for the 1971 and 1972
funds, respectively.
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While the relative diminuitive returns for RELPs organized
by the the two largest sponsors may not be indicative of the
entire market, this information does help to show that RELPs do
not make one tremendously wealthy. In fact, since 1981, these
securities have provided miniscule returns exclusive of tax
benefits. This paper, however, focuses on a look at the
potential returns from RELPs created for securitizing different
stages of the development cycle. To do this, actual returns
from two types of partnerships -- land development and
acquisition of existing properties have been compared.
Centennial Group, a land development firm located in Southern
California, actively pursues land development by organizing
capital through public syndication. Information regarding the
first three deals sponsored by this group are included in
EXHIBIT 11. The returns to limited partners from partnership
securitizing the acquisition of existing properties by the
Angeles Group have been shown in EXHIBIT 10. The followinn
section of this chapter analyzes the returns of these RELPs.
B. Review of Selected Partnership Returns
Angeles Corporation was one of the first companies to
create, market, and manage RELPs. Formed in 1969, this firm
has brought to market more than 60 RELPs and, by the end of
1986, had raised more than $620 million in capital from more
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than 50,000 investors. Currently, this syndicator has more
than 20 public programs outstanding, both leveraged and
unleveraged. EXHIBIT 10 shows the returns to investors of thre
programs from this syndicator. The returns from the programs
include only cash distributions from both operations and sale
or refinancing with an appraised value of the partnership to
the investors for a final residual component of return.
Leverage used in these partnerships is minimal and all were
organized as blind-pools. According to the offering
prospectuses, the primary objective of these partnerships are
to 1) maximize cash distributions; 2) preserve and protect
investor capital; 3) obtain capital appreciation; and 4) make
acquisitions by paying a significant portion of the purchase
price in cash. Tax benefits are not mentioned as a goal of
these partnerships. Property acquisition occurred within 18
months of organization for all programs.
The first program (Angeles Income Properties, Ltd.),
organized in 1981, acquired seven properties --- five
residential and two commercial -- located primarily in
California and Florida and two have been sold, one each in 1986
and 1987. The second program (Angeles Income Properties, Ltd.
II), organized in 1983, acquired five properties -- three
residential and two commercial -- located in Alabama, Indiana,
and North Carolina. None of the properties have been sold
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although one property was refinanced in 1986. The third
program (Angeles Income Properties, Ltd. III), organized in
1984, acquired six properties -- two residential and four
commercial properties -- all located in different states. The
performance results of these RELPs are shown in EXHIBIT 10.
The Angeles Partnerships do not perform consistently in
terms of returns. It appears that the newer the partnership,
the lower the IRR as shown in the exhibit. Income Properties
(AIP), the first partnership, was organized in the summer of
1981 and distributed its first return to investors in 1982 of
7.4%. In subsequent years, the yield increased to 8% with
additional distributions from sales in 1986 and 1987. The
overall IRR for this investment equals 7.9% based on cash
returns. This is less than the assumed "risk-free" rate of 8%.
Income Properties III (AIP III), formed in 1984, returned 7.5%
in 1985 but decreased in subsequent years. This partnership
shows a negative IRR; investors have actually experienced a
decrease in value. Angeles Income Properties II (AIP II),
organized in 1983, falls between these two in terms of
performance. It should be noted that the IRR calculation is
based on the dissolution of the partnerships today using an
appraised value for calculating the net residual to the
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EXHIBIT 10
PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF SELECTED ANGELES CORPORATION PARTNERSHIPS
Income
Properties
(AIP)
Date Organized
Amount Raised
July-81
Income
Properties
Fund I
(AIP II)
March-83
$40,000.000
Number of Properties
Leverage at Inception
Cash Distributions by Year
-7
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Total Distributions
Net LP Value as of Oct-87
IRR to date
Profitability Index
N/A
$2,960,000
$3,200,000
$3, 200,000
$3,200,000
$30,000,000
$6,600,000
$49,160,000
$7, 800 000
7.9%
-0.08
1)
2)
$1,720,000
$3,500,000
$3,500,000
$11,150,000 3)
$1 ,iv,000
$21,400,000
$34,500, 000
3. 4X
-0.20
Notes:
1) Refinancing of $31 MM of which $30 MM
distributed to limited partners.
2) Property Sales of $14.5 MM and $8.6 MM for net gain of
of $8.4 MM of which $6.6 MM distributed to
limited partners.
3) Refinancing of $9.7 MM
Source: Argeles Corporation
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income
Properties
Fund III
(AIP III)
March-84
$43,460,000
6
297.
$782,280
$3,259,500
$2,607,600
$2,390,300
$9,039,680
$32,631,000
investors. Because the objective of the partnerships is to
hold such properties until it becomes advantageous to refinance
or dispose of the properties, the actual IRR to the investor
may be more or less than the value calculated today. The
profitability index for all three partnerships is negative.
This underscores the returns being less than our "risk-free"
rate of 8%.
While the results should not be uniform, the disparity in
the IRRs may be due to the "maturity" of the partnerships.
Yet, these RELPs only invest in existing properties which
should already be producing cash flow from the start. It is
interesting that AIP III shows a decrease in yield over time
from the start of the partnership! There are two possible
explanations for the trend in performance between the three
partnerships. First, the two newer partnerships had more
leverage at the inception of the partnerships than the first,
and AIP III is leveraged the most at 29% In addition, for AIP
III, financing terms include notes payable ranging in cost
between 8.3% and 16.5% suggesting that negative leverage exists
for this partnership. This leverage may make the cash flows
more sensitive to changes in operating income from the
properties. Second, the more recent the partnership, the
greater the investment in commercial properties. Whereas AIP
invested 42% of the total dollars in commercial properties, AIP
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III invested 82%. AIP II falls in between at 45%. It may be
that commercial properties experience greater variations in
cash flow than residential properties in the short term. This
would make comparisons between AIP and AIP III not meaningful
given the short history of the third partnership.
Overall, the performance of these RELPs suggests that the
yield for such RELPs investing in existing property may not be
substantial. The ability of the partnerships to acquire
properties at favorable terms does not hold true. While the
individual investor may not be able to buy such properties on
his own, he could do better by investments in other higher
yielding securities. The evidence presented is based on data
from RELPs existing for only a limited period. If one could
peer into the future, the returns from these RELPs could be
much different and might alter these conclusions. Even so,
existing properties, with the absence of inflation, do not
offer enough reward for the investment.
The Centennial Group, Inc. was formed in 1987 to
consolidate the six public partnerships formed since 1979 by
the general partner, the same entity which formed all six
partnerships. These six partnerships raised more than $197
million in funds and controlled almost 4,000 acres of land in
various stages of development and 300,000 square feet of
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commercial space already in operation or under construction.
All of the partnerships acquired land with the objective of
increasing value through development. All purchases were
located primarily in three areas: Riverside/San Bernadino,
California; Sacramento, California; and Phoenix, Arizona. Each
partnerships was organized as a blind-pool with property
acquisition completed within two to three years after
partnership formation. The use of leverage varied greatly
between partnerships, but none exceeded 70% of total asset
value. There are minimal tax benefits associated with land
development syndications with such benefits varying depending
on the amount of leverage. With the roll-up of the six
partnerships into a stock corporation, net asset values of each
of the partnerships were determined as of December, 1986.
Returns to the limited partners of the first three RELPs,
calculated as if the partnerships were dissolved in December,
1986 and the appraised values realized, are shown in EXHIBIT 11
The results from investment in the Centennial partnerships
are, at best, disappointing. Given the expectations of risk
and reward, investors must be disenchanted. (It could be that
the poor performance enticed the general partners to roll-up
the partnerships into a stock corporation so that all investors
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EXHlBIT 11
PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF SELECTED CENTENNIAL PARTNERSHIPS
CaPital
Fund
Date Organized
Amount Raised
Appraised Value (12/86)
Debt
Percent LeYeraged
Cash Distributions by Year
1979
1980
19 1
1982
19;84
19 85 
1986
Total Distributions
Residual Value
IRR
Proiitability Index
September-79
$18,655,000
$37,599,800
$24,278,600
$0
$4,600,000
$ Q
$3,768,000
$3,033,700
$0
$11,401,700
$13,321,200
5. 0%
Source: Centennial Corporation
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Development
Fund 11
August-81
$14,499,000
$27,540,100
$10, 393 ,300
Development
Fund III
October-82
$40,417,000
$68,244,300
$14,228,800
38. 21%
$0
$0
4850,000
$0
$0
$17,146,800
$0
$0
$449,500
$0
$449,500
$54,015,500
7. 3X
-0.08
4.5
as a group would benefit (suffer?) together.) The best
performing partnership of the three is the most recently
formed. Yet, its IRR to the investor as of December, 1986 is
only 7.8%, not much better than investing in existing
properties. The other two partnerships, while older, do worse
in terms of IRR with both yielding around 5%. The
profitability index for all partnerships is negative. While
the Capital Fund and Development Fund II have different IRR
returns, the profitability index for the two RELPs is
identical. Thus, by this return measure, the investor is
equally worse off by investing in either fund versus a
"risk-free" investment. It should be noted that the
performance results include the residual value of the
partnerships' interest in properties remaining in the
portfolios. The actual return to the investor may differ from
the returns shown in the exhibits.
The degree to which property development has proceeded
among these partnerships varies with the age of the partnership
but may not have an impact on the returns. In the Capital
Fund, for example, seven of the eight land parcels have been
developed, of which three have income-producing structures, and
the IRR to the investor is only 5%. Three of the seven
properties for Development Fund II have been developed although
no building construction has occurred. For Development Fund
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III, three of the eight properties have been improved. A
portion of one of its three properties has been further
developed with a retail center. Yet, even though the least
developed of the three partnerships, the calculated return to
the investor is the highest. It may be that this partnership
acquired parcels with more appreciation potential than those
acquired by the first two partnerships.
The difference in the returns may be due to the amount of
leverage in the partnerships. By December, 1986, the Capital
Fund and Development Fund II were leveraged at 65% and 38%
respectively while Development Fund III was leveraged at only
21%. It could be that the cash requirements of the debt
service for the first two RELPs consumed some of the value
created through property sales and income thereby lowering
returns. Even so, the first fund, with higher leverage,
actually has performed somewhat better than the second though
not by much. This may only be due to the longer life history
of the first fund and inherently greater appreciation in its
properties due to the passage of time.
In comparing the results of these two groups of
partnerships, it appears that the returns to the investors
certainly do not warrant investment in these RELPs. The higher
risk factor of the land development RELPs does not seem to be
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offset by higher returns versus the income RELPs. In relative
terms, the two newer land funds have performed somewhat better
than the income funds but this comparison is meaningless given
the higher yields possible from other forms of investments. On
the other hand, the lifespan of the land funds should be of
shorter duration than the income funds. Value in land
development is created through the efforts of the syndicator to
improve property. Unless the objective is to "bank" the land
for a period of time, development should commence immediately
with results known within several years. Because these
partnerships were not formed to bank land, the results for the
Centennial partnerships, while slightly better than the Angeles
partnerships, are worse relative to the "expectations" of
returns. Looking at the residual values for the land funds,
the efforts of the sponsor to increase value given the risk of
land development have not enriched the investor to date. Of
course, land development is more risky and perhaps the sponsor
failed to create significant value in the properties. Yet,
given the fast growth of the areas in which Centennial has
acquired land, it seems more likely that the sponsor did not
look after the investor but rather mismanaged the activities of
the partnerships.
While the greater risk of land development did not return
greater rewards to the investor for the Centennial investor, it
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does not prove that this will always be the case. In fact, it
appears that mismanagement is more likely a reason for the poor
performance. The Recorp Companies (Phoenix, Arizona), a land
syndicator sponsoring private partnerships, has, in the 15 land
development partnerships formed and closed since 1983, yielded
280% on investor dollars with an average holding period of 9
months! j/ clearly, risk can be rewarded.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE DEVELOPMENT EQUITY SYNDICATION
A. The Copley Experience
For more than 20 years, Copley Real Estate Advisors
(Boston, Massachusetts) has invested in development equity
partnerships assembling a portfolio of more than $4.5 billion
in assets today. While Copley forms its RELPs with funds from
institutions and wealthy individuals, its partnerships' strive
to increase investor wealth through investment in developmental
real estate. For this reason, it makes sense to explore their
investment results and suggest how such strategy can be
reproduced for the ordinary RELP investor.
Copley's strategy has been to place funds in differing
phases of the development cycle as warranted by the risks and
rewards. This risk is managed by evaluating different
positions in the development cycle across a wide range of
product further diversified by geography. Copley analyzes
extensively major markets for opportunity and makes investments
which meet internal criteria of risk and return. As part of
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their strategy, they attempt to link-up with a few developers
in each market who specialize in different product types,
particularly suburban office, R & D, and industrial projects.
These relationships are cultivated over time and provide a base
of repeat business.
Quite simply, Copley subscribes to the belief that greater
returns can be accomplished through taking risk of development
versus merely acquiring property. According to Joe O'Connor,
President of Copley, most investors expect that cash yields on
development property, once in operation, should yield returns
of 12.5% to 13% before leverage. The overall discounted yield
or IRR should come in the range of 17% to 18%. Copley's
historical track record indicates that they have bettered their
own expectations.
For a sample of 40 completed joint venture projects
representing the development of 500 properties of 23 million
square feet since 1967, the average overall IRR equaled 23% for
the investors. These properties were developed in conjunction
with 22 developers in 12 different states, and include
properties of at least four years of age with an average
operating track record of under eight years. The range of
IRR's to the investor for the 40 projects goes between a -5%
return to nearly 80%. Surprisingly, Copley suffered a loss in
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only one project out of the 40. In over 90% of the sample, the
returns of the investments provided returns above a "risk-free"
rate, the return which could have been realized by safer
investments like high-grade corporate bonds.
When a smaller sample of 18 joint venture developments is
examined for actual variance from both expected income and
costs of development, the results show only small deviations.
Shell costs, in 95% of the cases, came within plus or minus 10%
of projections, with a mean variance of 2% for the entire
sample. In a 17-year period, for $1 billion of development
costs, actual shell construction costs came very close to
projected costs. It should be noted that most of the projects
are fairly simple office and industrial buildings with short
construction periods. Soft costs, primarily interest expense
and other non-direct development costs, showed a mean variance
from projections of negative 6%. In most cases, the soft costs
came in lower than projected at the outset of development. The
mean variance for total development costs was a negative 1%.
For 93% of the sample, total costs came in within plus or minus
10% of projected total costs.
The most important measure of return is the cash-on-cost
yield of the development property. For the sample group, the
average cash-on-cost yield equaled 15.7% While 19% of the
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sample had yields lower than projected, the remainder, 81%, had
yields greater or equal to the initial projections of yield.
Keeping in mind that Copley expects such yields to fall between
12.5% and 13%, their portfolio has performed better than their
own expectations. 
./
The upshot of Copley's experience indicates that the risk
of development does not fall within the construction aspects of
development. Construction costs, both hard and soft costs,
have come very close to expected values. The greater risk, the
one in which the developer has less control, comes in the
lease-up phase. Yet, as the cash-on-cost yields show, Copley
has done very well in managing this risk. Given the spread
between a cash-on-cost yield of 15% and a market capitalization
rate of 9% to 10%, Copley has certainly created value through
development. For investors staying in such properties, once
operating, the current yields should be quite high, higher than
investing in such properties at the last stage of the
development process.
The experience of Copley indicates that development equity
joint ventures can provide substantial yields. The question
remains whether such yields can be found for the RELP organized
to invest in development deals. I maintain that it can be
done. The manner in which Copley structures its investments
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can be used as a framework for the RELP.
Copley structures its investments by requiring that its
investment funds receive a priority return on cash from
operations before sharing with the development partner. It
splits the residuals 60% or more for investors with the balance
to the development partner. For this split, Copley requires
little or no invested cash on the developer's part. For
matching investment funds with the capital needs of developers,
Copley receives an asset management fee equal to 1% of the
asset value. There is no reason a RELP sponsor could not
structure the same terms or better. In fact, Copley has
recently offered three public RELPs, known as Copley Realty
Income Partners, which will be investing in joint venture
developments. The terms of the deals are such that the sponsor
receives a number of different fees. The largest fees come
from acquisition and disposition fees, organization fees,
on-going management fees as a percentage of cash flow, and a
15% share of the residuals. Investors get 99% of the cash
flows, after the advisory fee, and 85% of the residuals. As an
incentive to the investors, an 8% preferred return of invested
capital, non-compounded, is included as part of the deal
structure.
Copley's venture into the public marketplace is futher
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evidence of the argument of this thesis -- development equity
syndications will become the next wave of offerings presented
to the public. The next section of this chapter explains the
development equity syndication and gives reasons why investors
should be attracted to this type of RELP.
B. Explaining the Development Equity Syndication
The development equity syndication, like any other
syndication, represents the aggregation of capital resources
from a pool of investors. This capital pool, unlike most other
syndications, is formed for the purpose of pursuing the
development of land and/or buildings. Such investment can be
made in a single or several development ventures. Achieving
higher returns on invested capital becomes the sole reason for
the existence of the development equity syndication. Because
the security represents only the promise of performance with no
historical record of returns, the risk to the investor is
greater with this form of RELP. Accordingly, the returns
should reflect the higher degree of risk taken.
Purpose
Investing equity capital in the development of land or new
construction serves as the simple purpose of this kind of RELP.
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The one important caveat of these deals shall be that the
sponsor does not act as the developer but rather as an
organizer and fiduciary to the investor. The actual
development is carried out by a third party. Of course, this
third party may be an affiliate of the sponsor but, for the
purpose herein, the assumption shall be made that the sponsor
and the developer represent separate groups. The RELP only
serves as the capital pool which funds the development effort.
The assumption is made that such capital pools can fund
development at or below the cost of other sources of capital
for the developer. Perhaps more important is the fact that the
pool of capital exists and is accessible to the developer.
While other sources may exist, there may be reasons, besides
cost, that developers may want to participate with such a RELP.
Access, control issues, and on-going relation factors may play
a role in attracting developers to sponsors promoting such
RELPs.
Real Estate Product and RELP Structure
The basic structure of the development equity syndication
parallels the Copley model closely except that the sponsor's
compensation may be calculated differently. The RELP acts as
the single limited partner in one or many development projects
with the developer partner(s). In essence, each project could
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be considered as a joint venture between the RELP and the
developer. The sponsor's role will always be to act as the
general partner to the RELP and make all investment decisions.
In some cases, the sponsor may also act as a general partner
within the joint venture(s) as well. The sponsor will collect
a fee for organizing and advising the partnership both for
investment decisions and for providing on-going management of
the project(s). At the dissolution of the joint venture(s) or
upon any capital event, the partnership will split the profits
or proceeds with the development partner, and the sponsor shall
be entitled to a share of the partnership's profits. In those
cases where the sponsor also acts as the general partner to the
joint venture(s), the sponsor shall be entitled to a profit
split outside of the partnership's profits as well.
The structure of the RELP can impact the returns to the
investor. The first decision focuses on determining the stage
of development in which the fund will invest. What kinds of
risks will be included? For example, will the RELP invest in
only those projects already having received government
approvals or will this be part of the development program?
Related this will be the product type. If land, will only
residential land be developed? Or, will the partnership seek
to acquire land in which zoning changes will be needed to
realize added value? Should specific investment objectives
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limit the sponsor's activities? Should the fund specify its
investments prior to offering or not?
For the land development fund, it would seem best to
identify specific properties as part of the offering. This
gives the investor a chance to evaluate the potential for the
immediate development of the property. Because the sponsor
must make such evaluation as part of the offering,
pre-specification mitigates the investor's risk. Second, if
the land does not need to be immediately developed, it can sit
waiting for development while the sponsor organizes the RELP.
On the other hand, the building development fund should be
organized as a blind pool. The sponsor needs the freedom to
pick and choose among between numerous possibilities for those
developments will be most rewarding. The idea is to diversify
risk of development through product and geographical
distribution. While such a fund could be specified, the nature
of the building development business is such that as
opportunities appear quick evaluation for investment is needed.
The time needed to identify such opportunities prior to the
organization of the RELP may not permit for such a time lag if
the RELP attempts to specify the properties.
The use of leverage also needs to be decided by the
sponsor as well. Of course, leverage increases the risk to the
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investor through default yet may provide for better returns.
On the other hand, the use of leverage reduces the total amount
of funds needed to complete the development. What might be the
optimal decision?
The leverage answer depends on the nature of the
underlying asset. In land development, if the property is to
be held for some period prior to development, it makes more
sense to avoid leverage and its cost. If the property is to be
immediately developed, leverage provides for greater returns.
For the building development partnership, the leverage question
is moot. Simply stated, the cost of capital for a building
constructed with all equity funds is prohibitive for the RELP.
The returns demanded by the equity capital for taking this
amount of risk eliminates the returns for the sponsor and
development partner. (This is not to say that it cannot be
done, however.) Rather, the partnership should use leverage to
magnify the returns thereby providing incentives for both the
sponsor and development partner to have an interest in a
successful project.
The last decision will be whether the RELP will be public
or private. If a large pool of funds is needed, the public
vehicle might provide for greater distribution. The private
syndication, while smaller, may provide for greater flexibility
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in terms of deal structure and lower costs for organization.
For the land development RELP acquiring a large tract of land
to be developed in stages, the public fund is likely to provide
the large amount of dollars needed. With the larger tracts,
the time required to organize the fund has less impact on the
overall returns given the greater time horizon needed to
develop large tracts. The private fund would permit the
sponsor to acquire a smaller tract which will be developed
immediately. The time necessary to organize the fund is much
quicker and allows for faster action. The private fund may
also permit the sponsor to take on tracts with greater risks;
it may be more difficult to sell a partnership to the public
where the risk of payback appears so great that the average
investor would have no interest. For the building development
fund, the public versus private decision may be easier. The
building development fund is probably best organized as a blind
pool and thus lends itself to the public market.
Returns to the Investor
The investor, sponsor, and the developer partner will all
share in the profits of the venture, if any. What will be the
distribution of the returns? Should the investors receive a
preferred rate of return which might lower the return to the
sponsor and developer should the performance be less than
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anticipated? Does that destroy certain incentives for the
development partner to remain in the project? Of course, the
question of when will the returns be distributed also comes
into play. Will the developed property be sold or held for
investment? This, of course, impacts the projected maturity of
the RELP.
Given that the investor is applying capital to a more
risky investment, the investor should receive a preferred
position in any distributions equal to an alternative
"risk-free" rate. In this manner, the investor will feel that
the RELP will offer at least this return which could be
achieved through alternative investments. More importantly,
the return of invested dollars at the "risk-free" rate should
be considered as a cost of the deal, not a return paid out of
profit. Profit returns should be split between the three
groups in such a manner that each party has an interest in
remaining in the project until completion. Most importantly,
the developer should always feel that he has a stake in the
project regardless of the ultimate performance. Splits should
not be structured so that a minimum profit comes to the
investors before the sponsor and developer. Whether or not the
property is held once operating depends upon the motivations of
the parties entering the venture. There is no "right" answer.
94
With such risk, why then should the development equity
RELP gain favor with investors? First, for the same level of
investment as any other RELP, the investor can expect a higher
rate of return. While this return may not be achieved given
the risk, the potential for a higher return exists. While
other alternative investments (non-real estate) may also offer
high yields, such yields only come with an associated degree of
risk. The development equity syndication, while risky, offers
an investment in a physical asset. This asset has value in and
of itself; the funds go towards the ownership of the asset
itself. While it is possible that this capital could be lost
through foreclosure, proper selection and management can do
much to avoid this risk. Moreover, the possibility of placing
additional funds into the asset to delay foreclosure, while
diluting ownership, can further protect the original investor
from a complete loss. In a sense, the investor can give up a
portion of the development profit, generally 20% to 25% above
the development cost, to insure some portion of his investment.
Second, the development equity RELP permits the investor
to get into choicer properties without competing with other
buyers desiring ownership of such properties once completed. V
By getting into these properties at an earlier stage, an entire
level of competition is eliminated. While the level of risk
increases through earlier investment in the development phase,
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the on-going return from operations increases as well,
especially if the property performs as anticipated.
Third, when organized for the purpose of investing in the
development of several properties, such diversification offsets
non-systematic risk. The poor performance of one property or
more can be offset against the better performance of other
properties. Diversification does not protect against a general
economic decline or other larger market forces but does protect
against a few poor investments. The beauty of the RELP is that
it allows the investor the ability to do so by purchasing one
small security versus making a single, often large, direct
investment in one development property. His risks become
narrower through the pooling of funds with others.
Fourth, the investor places the management and oversight
of his funds in the hands of professionals trained in
evaluating and managing development properties. While the
investor pays for this service through fees to the sponsor of
the RELP, he need not have the knowledge and experience to
participate in these kinds of ventures.
Fifth, the time duration necessary for determining whether
or not a significant return can be realized should occur within
a few years from the original investment. once completed, a
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value of the development can be ascertained through appraisal
and, if the objective of the partnership is to dispose of
properties upon completion, the investor will recognize his
gain (or loss). RELPs which invest in existing properties
often require the passage of seven or more years before
dissolution and recognition of any gain or loss.
Finally, no tax events occur during the development period
until the property is sold or enters operation. Thus, the
investor need not be concerned with a tax payment occurring
without a cash distribution during the period of his
investment.
Sponsor Role in Management
While organizing a RELP presents its own difficulties,
this effort does not require any skills distinct from
organizing any other form of RELP. The on-going management of
the sponsor combined with the requirement that the sponsor
understand the development industry separates this kind of RELP
from those investing in existing property. The sponsor must
possess the skills to correctly evaluate and choose those
developments in which the RELP will participate. Moreover, as
the developments proceed, the sponsor needs to actively review
the progress and take action as appropriate. This brings up
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the immediate question of the role of the sponsor in the
development process. Should the sponsor be a general partner
with the developer or should the RELP invest as a sole limited
partner? If the latter is the case, then the sponsor removes
himself from the role of controlling the development. Would
this be wise?
For both land and building development, the question of
the sponsor's involvement as a general partner in the
development joint venture depends on several criteria. For
those partnerships assembled as public partnerships, the
sponsor should only play the role of the general partner to the
partnership, not to the ventures with third party developers.
The rationale is simple -- the sponsor needs to act as a
fiduciary to the limited partners and not subject its interest
in the venture to liability which could endanger its control of
the limited partnership. This rationale rests upon the fact
that most public RELPs tend to be of considerable size and
would probably invest in several development projects at once.
For private RELPs, the decision rests on the size of the fund
and the number of properties acquired. For a fund investing in
one development property, it makes more sense that the sponsor
play a more active role. After all, the assets of the
partnership are invested in one property and its failure to
perform wipes out the assets of the partnership anyway. If the
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RELP invests in several properties, then the sponsor may not
want to become a general partner in the ventures itself.
Again, the sponsor would not want to expose its position in
other properties of the RELP to any one development project.
Summary
Overall, the development equity RELP, while more risky,
can offer greater returns. This paper has shown that investors
in RELPs acquiring existing properties often do not receive a
substantial cash return on their investment for a period of
many years. Therefore, it makes sense for such investors to
find interest in more speculative RELPs which do not offer any
current income but can yield substantially more overall within
a shorter time frame. As investors now focus on such cash
returns, the development equity RELP should become a more
desirable investment vehicle for those desiring real estate
investments through this form of security.
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